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A Conflict Model




The study of intranation political conflict has received a great
deal of attention in recent years. Various models-sometimes
explicitly specified but often left implicit in the research-have
been employed in attempts to explain the causes and conse-
quences of internal instability. This paper outlines a model of
conflict behavior within nations which reflects the idea that a
behavior of such complexity can be understood only through a
multidisciplinary approach. That is, a synthesis of a number of
models is necessary to explain instability behavior or, for that
matter, any other form of conflict behavior (compare Fink,
1968; Mack and Synder, 1957).
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Further, the authors consider conflict from the point of view
of both the strategist-who seeks to engage in conflict behavior
to obtain a specified goal or set of goals-and the manager-the
actor desiring to limit the scope or intensity of conflict
behavior. It is important that the term &dquo;strategist&dquo; not be
interpreted as being equivalent to &dquo;insurgent,&dquo; &dquo;civilian,&dquo; or
&dquo;revolutionary.&dquo; Nor is &dquo;manager&dquo; a term to denote only
political authority or government. At times, it may be civilian
groups who attempt to manage the level of conflict, just as it
may be persons of authority who seek to engage in violence.
Terry Nardin (1971: 15) points out that conflict management
need not be biased toward the maintenance of the status quo:
Indeed, because of the greater access of topdogs to the means of
coercion, their capacity for violence usually far exceeds that of the
underdogs. Violence may indeed be yet another of the privileges of
rank. If most of the violence in conflicts between topdogs and
underdogs is committed by the topdogs, then conflict management
being the limitation of all violence, cannot be seen as prima facie
favoring the topdogs. The equation of conflict management with the
suppression of discontent, protest, and radical political action is not
the inevitable consequence of valuing &dquo;negative peace,&dquo; but follows
rather from a conceptual confusion about the nature and causes of
political violence.
The model presented here is a statement of the calculus
which members on either side of a conflict situation could
evaluate prior to their actions. Hence, the model is applicable
for both strategists and managers (compare Leites .and Wolf,
1970).
THREE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY
OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR
THE INSTINCTIVE EXPLANATION OF AGGRESSION
Some authors, such as Konrad Lorenz (1966) and Robert
Ardrey ( 1966, 1961) regard human aggression (of which
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political turmoil is a part) as stemming from an instinctive drive.
States Lorenz (1966: x): &dquo;Aggression ... is an instinct like any
other and in natural conditions it helps just as much as any
other to ensure the survival of the individuals and the species.&dquo;
Ethologists maintain that stimuli may enhance aggressiveness
but are not necessary for its manifestation. Aggressive behavior
will occur even in the absence of external cues. This essential
spontaneity of the aggressive instinct renders measures against
its damaging effects of no value. &dquo;The most promising means we
can apply in our attempt to cope with the miscarrying of
aggression-and that of other patterns of social behavior-are
those which have proved their efficiency in the course of
phylogenic and cultural evolution&dquo; (Lorenz, 1966: 278).
Lorenz suggests redirection of aggression into sports and other
forms of activity.
FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION MODELS
In contrast to the instinctive drive view of aggression are the
stimulus-response models, the most notable of which was
originated by Dollard et al. (1939). A basic postulate of their
frustration-aggression model is that aggression is always the
consequence of frustration. Aggression is any act &dquo;the goal
response of which is the injury of the person toward whom it is
directed,&dquo; and frustration is an interference with the occurrence
of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in a behavior
sequence (Dollard et al., 1939: 1-9).
Dollard et al. (1939: 1) hypothesized originally that the
occurence of aggressive behavior assumes the existence of
frustration and that the existence of frustration necessarily
leads to some form of aggression. Misinterpretation of this
sweeping statement caused Miller (1941: 338) to rephrase the
latter portion of the hypothesis thusly: &dquo;Frustration produces
instigations to a number of different types of response, one of
which is an instigation to some form of aggression.&dquo; Thus, the
model does not imply that frustration always leads to direct,
overt aggressive behavior. Rather, the hypothesis states that
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when aggressive behavior does occur, it is the result of
frustration (see Berkowitz, 1969: 68-69, 1965, 1962; Buss,
1961 ).
The frustration-aggression model has been a popular frame-
work for the study of domestic conflict. As Feierabend et al.
(1969: 635-637) point out, one source of &dquo;systemic frustra-
tion&dquo; within a nation is a gap between the aspirations and
expectations of individuals or groups on the one hand, and the
achievements that actually occur (see Gurr, 1970, 1968a,
1968b). Samuel Huntington (1968: 53-54), in his discussion of
political turmoil within developing nations, comments:
Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the
traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment,
new possibilities of satisfaction.... The ability of a transitional
society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much
more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap
develops between aspiration and expectation.... This gap generates
social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the
gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.
The frustration-aggression model has also been employed by
William Komhauser (1959) in his discussion of extremist voting,
by Daniel Lemer (1963), who based some of his work dealing
with modernization on the concept of deprivation felt by the
masses, and by Hadley Cantril (1965). Similar recognition of
the frustration-aggression explanation of political instability can
be found in the works of Davies (1962), Gurr (1970), Russett
( 1964), and Tanter and Midlarsky ( 1967).
One can see in the instinctive-drive and frustration-aggression
models a crucial disagreement as to the cause of aggressive
behavior. On the one hand, ethologists argue that aggression is a
drive as innate, as natural, and as powerful as sex (Storr, 1968:
109); on the other, Dollard and like-minded theorists maintain
that if frustrating stimuli are removed, aggression will not occur.
Anthony Storr (1968: 109), whose bias is evident in the
following quote, voices the difference between these two
perspectives.
[813]
It is vitally important that we finally discard the kind of futile
optimism which is implicit in the frustration-aggression hypothesis,
and face the fact that, in man, as in other animals, the aggressive
drive is an inherited constant, of which we cannot rid ourselves, and
which is absolutely necessary for survival.
Both approaches are similar, however, in that they neglect
the rational, conscious aspect of political man. Domestic
conflict does not stem totally from instinctive drives. Nor is it
solely a response to perceived frustrations. Individuals or groups
often engage in aggression because they have found such
behavior rewarding (Bandura et al., 1963) or necessary for the
attainment of a particular goal. Herbert Kelman (1965: 6)
writes, for example, &dquo;While war does involve aggressive behavior
on the part of many individuals, this behavior is not necessarily
at the service of aggressive motives. Leaders may engage in
aggressive behavior for strategic reasons, for example, and the
population at large for reasons of social conformity.&dquo;
Moreover, discontent and dissatisfaction are continually
present somewhere within every society. An awareness of these
conditions is certainly necessary to an understanding of conflict
behavior, but it does not constitute in itself an adequate
explanation. To ascertain why discontent leads to violence in
some instances and to nonviolent bargaining in others, one must
examine the ability of bargaining conditions to endow certain
kinds of tactics with efficiency in enhancing future bargaining
power to achieve all kinds of values (Nieburg, 1969: 44). Thus,
conflict behaviors of varying intensities may be viewed by
actors as potential tactics which may be utilized or rejected
depending upon their probabilities of success given a particular
goal or series of goals, plus certain other information.
DECISION-MAKING MODELS
A third approach to the study of conflict conceives of the
actors involved as being rational decision makers. Conflict, from
this point of view, is rooted neither in instincts nor in
psychological frustrations. Rather, as Jessie Bernard (1957: 38)
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states: &dquo;Conflict arises when there are incompatible or mutually
exclusive goals or aims or values expressed by human beings&dquo;
(see also Boulding, 1962; Axelrod, 1970). Employing rational-
choice models in the analysis of noneconomic social behavior is
hardly new. John Harsanyi (1969), for example, argues that
both the interest-group assumptions of domestic politics and
the national-interest conception of international politics are, in
effect, imprecise and informalized versions of a broad rational-
choice approach. The same may be said of the Marxist theory of
class interest (compare Olson, 1968: 102-110).
In the area of conflict management, rational-choice consid-
erations may be found in the work of a number of authors.
Scott (1970), for instance, uses an explicitly economic ap-
proach in his study of insurgency. Leites and Wolf (1970)
similarly employ cost-benefit analysis in a cogent discussion of
rebellion and counterinsurgency. H. L. Nieburg (1969, 1963,
1962) has long argued that violence within a conflict often has a
rational basis. Ted Gurr (1970: esp. 210-223) also recognizes
the value of taking the utility of violence into account in an
analysis of conflict. Rational choice models have, of course,
been employed most rigorously in the fast-growing area of
experimental gaming, and game theory is a fruitful source for
the development of both normative and descriptive models of
conflict behavior (see Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Davis, 1970;
Rapoport, 1970, 1966, 1960).
Although formal decision theory can be quite esoteric, the
fundamental ideas underlying this approach are intuitively
appealing. It is these basic propositions which we shall touch
upon here; for a more complete introduction, the reader is
advised to consult, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957),
Edwards and Tversky (1967), Savage (1954), or Edwards et al.
( 1965 ).
The most crucial concept of decision theory is that of
rationality. Simply stated, a definition of rationality has two
parts. First, rationality is the ability to order available alterna-
tive outcomes and consistently choose the more preferred over
the less preferred options. Second, a rational man makes his
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choices in such a way as to maximize something. Most decision
theories assume that the actor maximizes utility, or (under
certain conditions) expected utility.
In conflict situations, however, it is not enough for an actor
to consider only his actions, for the outcome will depend
generally on what his opponent does. The theory of games
focuses upon the various strategies open to rational actors in
conflict (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1970, 1966, 1960;
Davis, 1970). A strategy is simply a set of guidelines an actor
establishes which determine how he will respond should his
opponent act in any given way. Game theorists offer rules to
use in choosing among competing strategies.
The game theoretic approach to conflict is attractive for a
number of reasons. Formal models of conflict which employ
principles of game theory can be developed and studied in the
context of controlled laboratory experiments. The value of such
a model is the level of generality it possesses due to its freedom
from having to take into account the idiosyncracies of any
actual situation. By excluding these perturbations from its
framework, the model achieves what is sometimes called
&dquo;elegance.&dquo;
A price is paid for this elegance, however. Models structured
in a game theoretic manner are, by themselves, inadequate to
explain most aspects of human conflict. For the concepts and
insights of game theory to lead to a fruitful descriptive theory
of conflict, they must be integrated into a broader framework.
As Anatol Rapoport (1966: 206) notes, in formal game theory
there is no room for the psychological make-up of the
participants.
To the extent that psychological matters are allowed to enter a
theory of conflict, the theory ceases to be a model of rational
conflict. Its mathematical apparatus must then include parameters,
so that conflict behavior would depend on these parameters. The
theory would become a behavioral theory, and real behavior can
never be explained on the basis of concepts of &dquo;rationality&dquo; alone.
At least &dquo;rationality&dquo; must be modified to a relative concept to be
put into specific psychological contexts.
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Another shortcoming of game theory is that it is generally
limited to the analysis of decision-making under conditions of
complete uncertainty. That is, an actor is assumed to have
absolutely no information about the relative likelihood of
possible outcomes. Moreover, an actor is assumed to possess
perfect knowledge regarding his opponents’ utility functions
and regarding the outcome once he and his opponents have
chosen strategies. These assumptions may be unnecessarily
restrictive in many instances. An alternative model-the subjec-
tively expected utility (SEU) model-offers another approach.
Although the SEU model is typically employed to study games
against nature, it may be a not entirely unrealistic model of
decision-making within a conflict.
Leonard Savage (1954) was among the first to argue for a
decision system which allows the decision maker to utilize
whatever information he may possess in order to establish a
subjective (or personal probability distribution concerning
possible states of nature. Subjective probabilities have mathe-
matical properties similar to those of &dquo;objective&dquo; probabilities,
but there is an important difference. A subjective probability is
simply a number that represents the extent to which an
individual thinks that a given event is likely (Edwards, 1961).
Once a subjective probability distribution has been developed
(and Savage axiomatically derives a method for doing so), the
problem is transformed essentially into an exercise in decision-
making under risk. The actor still does not know for sure what
will happen if he acts in a given way, but he can make certain
probability statements about alternative outcomes.
In the theory of risky decision-making, the actor is assumed
to maximize his subjectively expected utility (SEU; Edwards,
1961, 1955; Savage, 1954; Luce and Raiffa, 1957: 299-306).
The SEU maximization principle stems from the traditional
mathematical notion of the expected value of a game of chance.
The expected value of a bet is obtained simply by multiplying
the value of each possible outcome, oi, by the corresponding
probability of occurrence, pi, and then summing these products
across all outcomes. Symbolically:
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To give a simple example, suppose that you were offered the
following bet: Roll a &dquo;fair&dquo; die; if a one or two comes up, you
win $3.00; if any other number occurs, you lose $2.00. Should
you take the bet? To answer this question, you must calculate
the expected value of the offer to determine whether this value
is favorable to you. The probability of obtaining a one or a two
is, obviously, 2/6. Therefore, the probability of obtaining any
other number is 1 - 2/6, or 4/6. The EV (expected value) is
thus computed:
The expected value of the bet is negative, a rather unattrac-
tive situation. Therefore, being the expected value maximizer
you are, you refuse the bet.
Making decisions about whether and how to act in a conflict
situation is obviously a more complex affair. The value of an
outcome must be replaced by the notion of utility. One must
determine how much utility, however measured, one attaches to
various alternative outcomes. Moreover, the probabilities of the
occurrence of possible events are not nearly so precisely known;
they must be estimated subjectively. Thus, in the SEU model,
the utilities of possible outcomes must be multiplied by
subjective probabilities, and it is the resultant subjectively
estimated utility which must be maximized.
To some, the notion of strict maximization is immediately
objectionable, and in many instances it does appear to be
unrealisitc. As Ward Edwards (1954a: 381-382) argues, how-
ever, &dquo;assumptions about maximization only become specific,
and therefore possibly wrong, when they specify what is being
maximized.&dquo; Riker and Ordeshook (1968: 27) point out that it
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is common for theorists to impose their own interpretation of
goals upon observed behavior (compare Shapiro, 1969). The act
of voting, for example, may appear irrational if one assumes
that the only goal is to elect a candidate to office; the costs of
voting almost always outweigh the probable influence of one
vote (Downs, 1957). However, if other benefits are taken into
account-such as feelings of patriotism, group identity, political
efficacy-then voting may often be rational. That is, the utility
of voting, particularly from a sociological and psychological
point of view, may often outweigh the costs involved.
Similarly, Rapoport (1960: 121) notes that there is more in
winning a poker game than simply the amount in the pot.
There is the jingling of the coins, the admiration of the onlookers,
the feeling of being &dquo;lucky,&dquo; etc. Perhaps if all of these things are
taken into account in some way, the gambling behavior (and more
generally all risk behavior) of people can be explained in terms of
maximizing some quantity. And if this quantity is different in
different people but can be determined for each person or for each
class of people, it seems worthwhile to try to do so; the discovery
would be an important psychological finding.
Whenever multiple motives are allowed to enter into the
decision model, however, one must confront the problem of
potential circularity. Many social scientists oppose the use of
rational-choice models because, given enough parameters, one
can &dquo;prove&dquo; that any decision is &dquo;rational.&dquo; This problem, these
social scientists would argue, becomes particularly apparent
when one tries to &dquo;explain&dquo; why an action was rational after it
has already occurred. Indeed, the popular term &dquo;rationalize&dquo;
was coined to emphasize the circularity involved in such a
process. Harsanyi (1969) clearly points out, however, that so
long as the number of parameters we hypothesize are both
relatively few and theoretically plausible, then circularity is not
a problem. He continues:
We must definitely resist the temptation of postulating more than a
very few basic motives in our theory, whether for the sake of
&dquo;greater realism&dquo; or for any other reason. This is so because a theory
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involving a large number of distinct motives, and therefore involving
a large number of parameters to be estimated from the empirical
facts, cannot be used to explain these empirical facts without
inadmissible circularity. This is of course just another way of saying
that if our theory is to have any real explanatory power then our
motivational assumptions must be kept at a very low level of
complexity-even if they do not have to be made quite as simple as
to postulate economic self-interest as the only important motive of
human behavior [Harsanyi, 1969: 521; italics in original].
A CONFLICT MODEL: SYNTHESIZING
COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES
What is proposed, then, is a model of conflict behavior which
takes into account a number of aspects of such behavior. The
model will stress the rational nature of decision-making in
conflict situations. This approach, however, will not neglect the
psychological and sociological factors important to an under-
standing of conflict.
One assumption of the present work is that conflict is rooted,
at least in part, in an incompatibility of the goals or aims of two
or more sets of actors. Hence, the model contains terms
referring to the goal-related costs and benefits associated with
engaging in various conflict behaviors. If:
Bg: the benefit an actor receives from obtaining specified
goal, g;
Pg: the subjectively estimated probability that the conflict
behavior will bring about Bg; 0 < Pg < 1;
Aj: the costs of engaging in a conflict behavior which are due
to an opponent’s response, j;
Pj: the subjectively estimated probability of opponent’s
response, j; 0 < Pj < 1;
n: the number of specified goals, g;
m: the number of possible opponent’s responses, j;
Ci: the costs of engaging in the conflict behavior which are
independent of the opponent’s response;
then, SEU, the subjectively expected utility of engaging in a
particular conflict behavior, can be expressed thusly : 1
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From the equation, it is evident that multiple goals, each
associated with some benefit, may exist. Each goal, in turn, is
associated with a subjective probability, P1, P2,..., Pn, that a
specific conflict behavior will result in the realization of the
goal (compare Wilson, 1961). Similarly, probabilities are associ-
ated with costs due to the opponent’s retaliatory measures.
Probabilities associated with costs and benefits may, of course,
be closely related. The probability that an action will achieve a
certain goal, for example, may often be related to the
probabilities that it will evoke certain retaliatory responses. The
term Q consists of such costs as resource outlays (both time
and material), costs due to foregone alternatives, and other
costs which must be absorbed regardless of the outcome of the
conflict. According to the model, an actor would evaluate the
costs and benefits associated with the possible conflict behav-
iors in which he might engage and choose that behavior with the
greatest net utility. The process of interaction between actors in
conflict is assumed to be composed of discrete decision points.
The SEU model denotes the static decision process undertaken
at each decision point. In this regard, this approach considers
conflict as a series of alternating decisions among actors.
As a rather elementary example, consider an instance in
which a revolutionary group seeks to raise funds or supplies
with which to strengthen themselves. 1 The cadre has before
them two plans from which they must choose. One plan is to
kidnap a government leader and hold him for $1,000,000
ransom. An alternative scheme is to ambush a military convoy
carrying $ 1,000,000 worth of munitions in two trucks.2
In the past, six kidnapping attempts have been made, of
which three have been successful (that is, have secured a ransom
without the participants being captured). In the other instances,
the abductors have been sentenced to long prison terms.
Possessing no other information, the rebels set their best
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estimate of the probability of success at .5. In terms of resource
outlays, the rebels estimate that a kidnap attempt will cost
$5,000, to cover such expenses as weapons, bribes, hideouts,
and time lost while in hiding. The SEU of a kidnap attempt is
calculated:
The SEU of an ambush attempt is calculated similarly. The
rebels estimate that they have a 20% chance of securing both
trucks of munitions and a 50% chance of securing one
truckload. There is, however, a 30% chance of their being
captured. An estimated $10,000 in resources would be neces-
sary to undertake the ambush. The SEU, then, is:
By comparing SEU, and SEU2, the rebels can see that the
kidnap offers a greater expected return than does the ambush-
but at a 20% greater chance of capture. If they decide that the
added likelihood of capture is worth the extra expected gain,
they should choose the kidnap plot. If not, they should decide
to ambush the convoy.
The model of decision-making in a conflict situation illus-
trated above is not as unrealistic as it may appear at first blush.
Although strategists and managers may not perform the
calculations as explicitly as depicted, there is reason to believe
that actors in conflict situations often bear in mind the
expected costs and benefits of alternative actions. As Abdul
Nasution (1965: 21) asserts in Fundamentals of Guerrilla
Warfare: &dquo;A guerrilla must fight with ... economy... he must
calculate his gains and losses like a good businessman.&dquo; Andrew
Scott has devised a similar model of insurgency. He notes
(1970: 40) that &dquo;the stakes for a participant may be thought of
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as the gains that he would derive from victory relative to the
losses that would be associated with defeat.&dquo;
The model may be particularly suggestive in regard to the
behavior of leaders within the context of a conflict, and by our
stress. on &dquo;strategists and managers&dquo; we have been implicitly
emphasizing the conduct of individuals in roles of leadership.
Gurr ( 1970: 211 ) writes:
Men make more or less explicit calculations about the prospective
benefits vis-a-vis the prospective costs of violence as a tactic. Such
calculations are likely to be more explicit among leaders, more
implicit among potential followers. The greater they believe the
potential gains to be, the more justifiable violence is likely to appear
to them.
There are, however, shortcomings in the model as it stands.
Most significantly, it does not take into account psychological
and sociological factors which may influence conflict behavior.
Lewis Coser (1964: 59) notes that &dquo;conflict may be motivated
by two distinct yet intermingled factors-a realistic conflict
situation and the affective investment in it.&dquo;
The potential psychological and sociological benefits of
engaging in conflict behavior are many. Psychological frustra-
tions or emotional factors may act as an instigation to
aggression. Certain conflict strategies might be considered
beneficial in that they allow the actor to express these feelings.
Leonard Berkowitz (1962: 220) suggests:
Aggression can be gratifying because it involves the expression of an
acquired aggressive motive, and/or it signals the reduction of internal
conflict, and/or it may restore self-esteem.... It may also be that
some of the pleasure following the display of aggression results from
the completion of a previously interrupted aggressive response
sequence. The interruption created tension, and the completion of
the sequence brought about a decrease in the disturbing internal
excitement.
Scott (1970: 87) similarly points out that &dquo;the existence of
emotional fervor or strong hatred can alter the cost picture
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because of the impact it has on the morale and determination of
the antagonists.&dquo;
In another vein, Coser (1964) writes of the group-binding
character of conflict. Thus, individuals may obtain a sense of
identity and &dquo;belonging&dquo; from engaging in conflict as a member
of some group. The group may be a relative vague one (e.g.,
&dquo;students&dquo;) or one which is more clearly defined (the U.S.
Marine Corps). States Coser (1964: 35): &dquo;It seems to be
generally accepted by sociologists that the distinction between
’ourselves, the we-group, or the in-group, and everybody else, or
the others-groups, out-groups’ is established in and through
conflict.&dquo; More abstract benefits, such as a sense of self-satisfac-
tion at doing what one considers morally correct, or socially
legitimate, may also be important motivating factors in a
conflict situation (compare Gurr, 1970: chs. 6 and 7).
In the model itself, the type of benefits described above
differ from Bg in that their realization may well be independent
of the outcome of the conflict. The term Di, then, is defmed as
the benefit an actor receives from engaging in a particular
conflict behavior act regardless of the outcome of the event.
In contrast to Di, there are various costs of a psychological or
sociological nature which may be associated with certain
conflict events. Because psychological costs are always involved
in the use of violence, Coser (1967: 107) notes, &dquo;it is expected
that only relatively small numbers of men will at any time be
ready to engage in a politics of violence. For only a few will the
psychic gains of violence outweigh the costs.&dquo; A pacifist, for
example, would consider engaging in violent conflict as being
extremely costly in a moral and psychological sense. Revolu-
tionary ideologies are likely to offer normative justification for
violence and hence rationalize away the moral costs of violent
conflict behaviors.
Social costs are also important to consider. One cost of
participating in clandestine operations may be social isolation
and personal sacrifice for many months. For example, RAND
Vietnam interviews (see Leites and Wolf, 1970: 43) report that
a Viet Cong defector gave these reasons for changing sides:
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I thought that in fighting on the GVN side, a soldier may be happy
because he has a good salary and even though he dies on the
battlefield, he dies with a full stomach. On the contrary, a VC
soldier usually eats at 3 p.m. a rice bowl as small as that [the subject
described it with his fingers] and he walks all night long to fight and
to die with an empty stomach.
It is, therefore, necessary to give a broader interpretation to
Ci so that it includes psychological and sociological costs as well
as resource outlays. Thus, the equation for determining the SEU
of a given conflict behavior is:
That there are costs and benefits which affect conflict
behavior is evident in the following passage from the tactical
manual published in connection with the 1971 May Day
antiwar demonstrations: &dquo;The aim of the Mayday actions is to
raise the social cost of the war to a level unacceptable to
America’s rulers. To do this, we seek to create the specter of
social chaos while maintaining the support or at least toleration
of the broad masses of American people&dquo; (New York Times,
1971 ). Thus, the May Day leaders (notably, Rennie Davis) were
concerned with stopping the Vietnam war not by raising the
government’s material costs, but by increasing the social costs
of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Violent demonstra-
tions were eschewed as being too costly in both moral and
strategic senses. Moreover, the demonstrators were aware that
they must minimize the social costs of their own behavior: they
sought to maintain &dquo;the support or at least toleration&dquo; of the
mass public. The May Day demonstrators, then, were acting as
both strategists and managers. They sought to raise the level of
conflict in one social context (Washington, D.C.) in order to
limit the intensity and scope of conflict behavior elsewhere
(Southeast Asia).
The May Day leaders’ strategy, ironically, bears similarities in
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some respects to the Johnson Administration’s attempts to
coerce North Vietnam. In this instance, the Administration was
concerned with increasing the costs to the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV) of infiltration of South Vietnam. Consider
this summary from the Pentagon Papers ( 1971 : vol. 4, p. 1 ) of a
memo from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara dated July
30, 1965:
Future bombing policy should emphasize the threat, minimize DRV
loss of face, optimize interdiction over political costs, be coordi-
nated with other pressures on the DRV, and avoid undue risks of
escalation.
Thus far, this section has presented a simple SEU maximiza-
tion approach to the study of decision-making within conflict
situations. If one were to focus on a single decision in a
conflict-e.g., a &dquo;turning-point&dquo; in a crisis-then this approach
might be particularly useful (compare Allison, 1969; Tanter,
1972). On the other hand, strategists and managers must often
be concerned with conflict which occur over time. This fact
adds two complexities to the simple SEU model :3 first, the
utilities associated with various goals and activities may vary
over time; and, second, the subjectively estimated probabilities
may be altered as a conflict develops.
The problem of utilities changing over time can be handled
with relative ease. The SEU model simply assumes that the
decision is based on the utilities that existed at the time the
decision was made. Utilities are free to change between
decisions so long as the actor uses his most recent utility
assessments in determining his actions.
Probability alteration over time is somewhat more complex.
An initial subjectively estimated probability (or probability
distribution) may be based on very sketchy information. As a
conflict progresses over time, however, and as various strategic
moves are attempted, additional information is generated
regarding the conflict situation as a whole. The question is:
How should such information be processed to allow the
reevaluation of one’s subjective probabilities?
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What is required is some method of determining a new (or
posterior) subjective probability, given some previous (or prior)
estimate plus some new information. The optimal solution to
this problem involves Bayes’ theorem. Elementary probability
theory defines P(D n H) as being equal to P(D H)P(H). That is,
the probability that both one’s information about the &dquo;true
state&dquo; and one’s own hypothesis about this state are true is
equal to the probability of the information, given the hypoth-
esis, multiplied by the probability that the hypothesis is true.
Some algebraic manipulation leads to a basic form of Bayes’
theorem:
(provided that P(D) and P(H) * 0).
A somewhat contrived, although not entirely unrealistic
example may be helpful in understanding how Bayes’ theorem
might be employed:
Two insurgent leaders are working together. One, I1 believes
that if they engage in activity, A, there is a .4 chance that the
government, G, will respond in a certain way. 12, however,
believes that G probably will respond, and he assigns .7 to this
probability. Either I1 or 12 is correct. I1 has, in the past, been
quite expert at outguessing G, so the probability that he is right
is set at .8. The probability that 12 is correct, then, is 1.0 - .8,
or .2. The insurgents engage in activity A and, sure enough, G
responds. How should 11 and 12 revise their estimates of who is
right in light of this datum?
Once again, Bayes’ theorem states that:
where P(D) = E P(D I H)P(H).
P(D H1 ) is the probability of the government responding,
given that I1 I is correct. This probability, we know, is .4.
Similarly, P(D I H2) = .7. Moreover:
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By substitution, then:
Thus, the insurgents have become slightly less confident that
I1 is correct and correspondingly less sure that 12 is wrong. This
is certainly what one would expect, given the datum. This
example is simplified in that it deals with point estimates of
probabilities rather than with continuous probability distribu-
tions. Nevertheless, the basic logic of the process is the same in
both instances (see, for example, Edwards et al., 1963).
The next question which one might ask is whether this
Bayesian model of information-processing reflects accurately
what occurs within the dynamics of a conflict situation. The
answer is that it almost certainly does not. There is, in fact, a
good deal of experimental work which has shown that human
beings tend to be &dquo;conservative&dquo; information processors when
compared with what one would expect from Bayes’ theorem
(Edwards, 1968; Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Peterson et al.,
1965).
If one is concerned with how strategists and managers should
process the information generated within the context of a
conflict, then Bayes’ theorem is quite germane. If, on the other
hand, an accurate description of information-processing is
desired, then it is clear that psychological and other factors
must be taken into account to explain the conservative nature
of human beings. This topic we must leave for discussion
elsewhere (see Edwards, 1968).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS
This essay suggests that it may be useful to consider conflict
situations as instances in which actors employ behaviors which
tend to maximize expected gains and minimize expected losses.
Moreover, we have pointed out that these gains and losses may
be related to factors other than the particular conflict of
interest. It is one thing to make such assertions, however, and
quite another to utilize such an approach empirically. A model
which considers sociopsychological aspects of a conflict situa-
tion within a framework of utility maximization is clearly
difficult to operationalize entirely. This does not imply that the
model is useless or irrefutable, however; a number of avenues
for research are potentially useful for the evaluation of the
model and its implications.
One possibility lies in the study of decision-making within
experimental settings. Experimental research on SEU and
similar axiomatic models of decision-making is well developed.
Most of these experiments focus on decisions about bets, but
the inferential step to decisions regarding other forms of risky
outcomes is not large. Problems which appear at first to be
insurmountable, such as the quantification of utilities and
subjective probabilities, have been shown to be soluble with a
little imagination and insight. Excellent bibliographies of
relevant literature are found in two works by Edwards (1961,
1954a).
An important development in conflict research would be to
combine decision-making experiments with more explicitly
social psychological investigations dealing with conflict be-
havior. Berkowitz (1969, 1965, 1962) has written extensively
about the latter type of research. The kind of investigation we
are advocating might examine, for instance, differences in the
nature of decisions made at different levels of psychological
frustration. Other experiments, similar to those conducted in
small-group research, could examine the decision processes of
individuals in isolation and within different group contexts.
Such experimentation would certainly be useful in uncovering
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evidence about the behaioral modifications necessary to make
decision theory more descriptive of conflict dynamics.
Another type of model evaluation might employ aggregate
data on domestic turmoil (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966;
Gurr, 1968b; Tanter, 1969; Markus and Nesvold, 1972). By
examining the success over time of various conflict behaviors
along with indicators of systemic frustration, relative depriva-
tion, and the like, one might ascertain the comparative
importance of &dquo;nonrealistic&dquo; (i.e., sociological, psychological,
and so on) factors versus &dquo;realistic&dquo; (i.e., conflict of interest-
related) factors in explaining conflict behavior.
The systematic analysis of particular cases might also serve to
evaluate the utility of the conflict model proposed here (Wedge,
1969). An in-depth study of how strategists and managers
behaved within particular contexts could aid greatly in the
understanding of decision-making in conflict situations.
Another approach would employ survey techniques to gather
information on individual attitudes about conflict as well as
information on the personal experiences of persons in situations
of political conflict (Levy, 1970; Cantril, 1965). Such a study
might uncover the psychological correlates of participation in
conflict behaviors of varying intensities. Moreover, one could
examine the ways in which individuals who participate in
political conflict differ from those who do not. Data gathered in
this way could also indicate whether individuals attempt to
weigh the costs and benefits of their potential actions during
times of conflict.
Thus, there are a number of methods available to evaluate the
validity of the conflict model proposed here. No single
approach is necessarily more powerful than any other. Rather,
the use of multiple streams of evidence gathered through a
number of techniques is the most desirable manner of ascertain-
ing the descriptive value of the SEU model of conflict
decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS
What, then, are the implications of this model of conflict
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behavior? By assuming a rational component of conflict, the
model implies that conflict behaviors-including violent ones-
may be engaged in by reasonable men. Thus, conflict is an
inevitable occurrence in social life, and violent strategies are
often continuations of a general bargaining process among
competing actors. Nieburg (1969: 81) makes the point well
when he writes:
The &dquo;rational&dquo; goal (in the behavioral sense of maximizing assets and
options) of the threat of violence is accommodation of interests, not
provocation of actual violence. Similarly, the &dquo;rational&dquo; goal of
actual violence is demonstration of the will and capacity of action,
establishing a measure of the credibility of future threats, not
exhausting that capacity in unlimited conflict.
Managers must recognize that conflict is unavoidable and that
often it has an objective basis in reality-namely, the incompati-
bility of the goals of the actors involved. This is not to say that
efforts to ease frustration, vent instinctive drive harmlessly, or
increase mutual understandings are not beneficial. Such efforts
can indeed serve either to prevent unnecessary conflict or to
keep conflict behaviors within certain bounds of intensity. The
point is that conflicts of interest are inevitable; in such instances
the manager must focus on how to regulate the scope or
intensity of conflict by manipulating the costs and benefits
associated with the range of potential behaviors. As Gurr (1970:
156) notes, &dquo;the greater the utility people attribute to tactics of
violence in getting what they want, the more readily they will
resort to political violence.&dquo; Put another way, the task of the
conflict manager is to affect the utility of violence so that
people will find it advantageous to employ other tactics.
Elsewhere in this issue, Fink presents a lucid discussion of
options available to conflict managers; comments in this essay,
therefore, will be brief (see also Gurr, 1970: 352-357).
It should be apparent, however, that to a society the
continued suppression of conflict is at least as dangerous as its
violent manifestation. A total lack of conflict representation is
as undesirable as the sole use of violent confrontation to resolve
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conflict. For the conflict manager to prevent these extremes of
the &dquo;spectrum of political options&dquo; from overwhelming the
center, he must maintain the efficacy and legitimacy of those
modes of political action which minimize violence and facilitate
social change (Nieburg, 1969: 159-160). This philosophy is
echoed in &dquo;The Port Huron Statement,&dquo; (Jacobs and Landau,
1966: 156) which established the early guidelines for the
Students for a Democratic Society. It reads, in part:
In social change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent
because it requires generally the transformation of the target, be it a
human being or a community of people, into a depersonalized object
of hate. It is imperative that the means of violence be abolished and
the institutions-local, national, international-that encourage non-
violence as a condition of conflict be developed.
The manager can affect the utility of violence in two ways.
One way, just mentioned, is to increase the utility of nonviolent
strategies. The other method, probably more common, is to
decrease the utility of violent strategies. One approach involves
establishing a pattern of coercive control or negative sanction. If
sanctions are applied clumsily or inequitably, however, they
may have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing future
violence (Gurr, 1970, 1968b; Leites and Wolf, 1970; Markus and
Nesvold, 1972). If the level of sanctions is perceived as being
inequitable or unjust, then the legitimacy of the manager-
either civilian or governmental-may be undermined.
This consequence leads to another management option. The
conflict manager can attempt to affect the social and psycho-
logical justifications for violence. In this regard, Gurr (1970:
352) notes: &dquo;a ruling elite can reduce the likelihood of violence
against itself by symbolically reinforcing its legitimacy, censor-
ing those who agitate against it, and providing diversionary
means for the expression of hostility.&dquo; Similarly, civilian
managers can enhance their impact and respond to govern-
mental strategists by emphasizing the legitimacy of their
demands and the basis of their social support.
The strategist should be aware that in the long run violence
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may not be beneficial to him, although it may bring immediate
gain. As already stated, the rational goal of violence is the
demonstration of a capacity for action, establishing a measure
of credibility for future threats, not the exhaustion of that
capacity. Thus, the strategist should attempt, by establishing his
credibility, to increase the costs to the target of ignoring future
demands to resolve a conflict. In this way, the strategist may
resort to violence so that less extreme modes of conflict
resolution will become more effective.
Additionally, the strategist should be aware that &dquo;nonreal-
istic&dquo; considerations may be coloring his decision to increase
the scope or intensity of conflict. Whether the strategist will or
even can account for-and thereby regulate-these factors is
difficult to answer. Nevertheless, the strategist may want to
consider if intensifying the level of conflict behavior is likely to
resolve the conflict of interest or solely benefit him in other,
perhaps more personal, ways.
Finally, the strategist may engage in a particular conflict
behavior precisely because of its &dquo;nonrealistic&dquo; utility. For
example, the integrative effect of group conflict behavior has
been touched on earlier. A conflict behavior may be chosen not
because it is particularly likely to achieve long-term goals, but
because it may bind the group together and thereby increase the
likelihood of success in later actions.
Some would argue that recent manifestations of conflict
within the United States have been qualitatively different from
conflict behaviors of the previous decade. Among students and
blacks, in particular, there seems to be an increasing awareness
of the necessity to coolly and &dquo;rationally,&dquo; if you will, assess
the cost-benefit parameters of conflict behaviors. Younger
strategists, for example, caution not to engage in action as part
of an &dquo;ego trip&dquo;; they urge that people attempt to &dquo;get it
together&dquo; or pause to evaluate the nature of the conflict. In any
event, strategists and managers must recognize the costs of both
protracted violence and refusal to bargain over conflicts of
interest. One must hope that a better understanding of
decision-making in conflict situations will allow competing
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actors to resolve conflicts before violent confrontation becomes
a necessary, if not attractive, tactic.
NOTES
1. For expository convenience, the SEU model has been decomposed to display
the benefits and costs comprising the model. Usually the model is presented in a form
similar to the EV equation described earlier.
2. The example assumes a linear utility for money function.
3. An additional potential complexity should also be mentioned. A number of
theorists have argued that the variance and even higher moments of a utility
distribution are as important as its SEU in determining a decision. Edwards (1954a:
401) offers this example: "You would probably prefer the certainty of a million
dollars to a 50-50 chance of getting either four million or nothing. I do not think this
preference is due to the fact that the expected utility of the 50-50 bet is less than the
utility of one million dollars to you, although this is possible. A more likely
explanation is simply that the variances of the two propositions are different.
Evidence in favor of this is the fact that if you knew you would be offered this
choice 20 times in succession, you would probably take the 50-50 bet each time."
Experimental research, however, shows that the issue of variance preference is not
at all straightforward (compare Edwards, 1954b; Royden et al., 1959; Coombs and
Pruitt, 1960). For this reason, this essay leaves the topic of variance preferences to
one side.
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